BOOK REVIEWS.
TnE MoNROE DOCTRINE: Its Importance in the International Life of the
States of the New World. By Alejandro Alvarez. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1924, pp. 560.
In spite of all that has been said and written concerning the Mfonroe Doctrine it still demands thoughtful study and interpretation. Profound differences of opinion regarding-its significance exist among Americans and Europeans, as well as among Latin-Americans. We need particularly to make the
effort to understand the attitude of the latter towards this historic declaration in order to understand their attitude towards the United States. The
danger of a widening difference of views and interests between this country
and the countries of the South of us, is very real.. They find it excessively
difficult to understand us and are often irritated by what seems our utter
failure to understand them. The reiterated pronouncements and assurances
of our statesmen concerning our national policy towards Latin-America have
served rather to increase this distrust and irritation. Our interpretation of
the Monroe Doctrine often seems to imply an alleged right of hegemony on
the part of the United States over the other American countries.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has rendered, therefore, a great service in making possible the publication of this compjendium
by Doctor Alvarez. Doctor James Brown Scott, Director of the Division of
International Law of the Endowment, well says in his preface to the book that
the best commemoration the Endowment could make of the one hundredth
anniversary of the Doctrine which has made for peace would be 'a collection
of expressions of opinion by Latin-Amerlicans regarding the Monroe Doctrine
and expressions of prominent North Americans upon the same subject."
Doctor Alvarez, the distinguished Chilean publicist, has performed this
task admirably, together with an historical introduction that enables one to
apprehend more intelligently the attitude of Latin-Americans on the subject.
Doctor. Alvarez was"peculiarly suited for this discriminating work of selection as he has devoted his main activities to the study and appreciation of
Latin-American affairs as attested by his numerous publications, notably Le
droit internationalamiericain. It is of interest to note his belief that the principles contained in Monroe's message "are not merely a policy of the United
States, but a legal ihrernational doctrine, because they have been affirmed by
all the States of the New World." He also believes that under the aegis of
this Doctrine. the Western Hemisphere has evolved its own system of international law distinct from that of Europe.
In this volume, therefore, is to be found a rich mine of ore to be worked
over by those eager to know how Latin-Americans interpret the Doctrine as
well as the views of some of the leading statesmen and publicists of the
United States. It.should be consulted together with the excellent work by
Albert Bushnell 'Irtentitled The Monroe Doctrine, An Interpretation.
Philip MarshallBroura.
Princeton University.
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AND MORALS. By Roscoe Pound. The University of North Carolina
Press, 1qM4, pp. iii, 146.

LAW

The little book before us represents a course of three lectures delivered

by Dean Pound at the University of North Carolina on the McNair Foundation. The passage in the will of Rev. John Calvin McNair, the founder of
the lectureship, relating to the foundation, reads as follows:
They (the Trustees) shall employ some able scientific gentle.
a course of lectures, the object
man to deliver before the students
of which lectures shall be to show the mutual bearing of science and theology
upon each other, and to prove the existence of attributes . . . of God
from nature. The lectures . • . must be prepared by a member of some
one of the evangelic denominations of Christians..
Substitute law for science and morals for theology, and the Rev, McNair's
purpose is admirably carried out in Dean Pound's lectures. And surely one
of God's attributes is justice; and the Law of Nature, of which Pound treats
considerably in the present lectures, is nature. Hence as the Law of Niture
School in Jurisprudence developed the idea of Justice, an attribute of God
was proved by nature.

Having satisfied, as we hope, or shall we say appeased, the shades of
Rev. McNair, we may proceed to a discussion of the valuable and informing
lectures of Prof. Pound.
To those who are familiar with Dean Pound's writings the book under
review will not cause any surprises, except that Dean Pound's omniscience
is always a new surprise to the reader of every new production of tie author.
We thus have in this little book Pound's classification of the development
of law into x. Primitive Law, 2. Strict Law, 3. Equity and Law of Nature,
4. Maturity of Law. S. Socialized Law, as against Maine's division into fiction, equity and legislation. The two divisions are not contradictory or incompatible. They are based upon different motives or principles of classification. Maine is primarily interested in those factors which cause the changes
in the law, the factors whicli are responsible for the general -progression of
the law, say, from status to contract, or any other progressive tendency of the

law which might be denominated as modern in contradistinction to ancient
or primitive or mediaeval. The factors or causes which keep the law in statu
quo Maine does not stop to consider. Pound, on the other hand, considers
the periods or stages of law, hence he has to recognize the stationary as well
as the progressive.
Another familiar feature of Pound's thinking that is found here, is his
proneness to view any theoretical feature of the jurisprudence of a given
school as determined by the needs -of the period and not by. logical or metaphysical necessity. This is of course a pragmatic point of view, but it makes
a certain kind of reader uncomfortable when he is told in effect, "Don't
trouble tQ criticize these views on the basis of their logic, as this is no better
and no worse than that of their opponents. Their point of view is to be
judged solely with relation to the needs of the place and the time in which
they lived. Thus in a period of growth there is an infusion of morals into
the law, and the philosophy of the period subordinates law to morals. In. a
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period of stability when the need is for a systematization and consolidation of
the new material brought into the law in the preceding period of growth,
the law becomes self-sufficient, and the jurisprudence of the time insists on the
differences between law and morals rather than on their similarity."
It is true that our logic is apt to be determined by our wishes, but it Is
also true that some of us do our best to reason independently of our wishes,
and this is precisely what distinguishes scientific and philosophic thinking
from loose every day thinking. What the relation of law is to moral., or
rather what the relation of law to morals should be, is a question capable of
discussion, if not of definitive answer, irrespective of time and place. There
is never a time when law and morals should be divorced. The analytic 4udy
of the law is one thing, an analytic theory that law has nothing to do with
morals is an absurdity, and has" never been taught in this bald form by any
one, as can be seen from the book under review.
Pound equates the analytical school of the nineteenth century with the
theory of the Sophists. Both held that law is by convention. It seems to
the present writer that the similarity is merely verbal. When the Sophists
said law is convention, they meant that it had no basis in nature. They went
so far as to say that justice itself is convention, and that by nature might is
the sole determinant and regulator of conduct in relation to one's fellowman. When the analytical jurist today says that law gets its authority from
the state, he differentiates between law aind justice, and also between proximate and remote sources of law. Justice is a remote source of law and
should guide the state in its enactments.
The author discusses the subject of Law and Morals under three heads.
7n the first lecture he gives a historical view of the actual relation between
law and morals in the five periods into which he divides the life of the law.
In brief the proposition is that law and morals were undifferentiated in the
period of primitive law; they were separated in the period of the strict law;
law was subordinated to morals in the period of growth Wihich followed the
strict law, and which is characterized by the introduction of Stoic doctrines
into the Roman law in the writings of the Classical jurists, by the development of the court of chancery and principles of equity in England in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the theories of the Law of Nature on the European Continent. Law and Morals were again separate in the
nineteenth century, which was a priod of stability and maturity of law. And
finally in our days, a period of unrest and growth, we are again coming back
to a dependence of law, not indeed on morals merely, but on the social needs
and desires of men, which the various social sciences put us in a position to
understand. This bald manner of stating the result is richly illustrated' and
effectively presented in Pound's book, to which the reader is referred.
In the second lecture the author presents the analytic view, which considers the ideal law as self-sufficii t and to be kept separate from morals. Espedally valuable in this lecture are the author's defense of the separation of
the functions of the judge and the legislator on which the analytical jurist
insists, as well as the criticism of the analytical point of view on other
grounds (pp. 48 ff.). Pound's discussion of the delimitation of the boundary
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between law and morals (pp. 69 ff.) is also admirable, like all the other discussions inthe book, for its -reasonableness and fairness and freedom from all
bias.
Finally in. the third lecture the author discusses the views of the philosophers, both those who belonged to the Law of Nature School and those, including Kant, Hegel, the Neo-Kantians and the Neo-Hegelians who, without identifying law with morals, nevertheless insisted on their close connection. Especially valuable here are the criticism of the natural law doctrine
(Pp. 95 f.), and the description of the new socializing tendency of the law,
which began at the close of the last century and is strong today (p. io8 f.).

Isaac Husik.
University of Pennsylvania.
LA Luoin JuVD1cIAI

DU CAPITAL ET Du TRAVAIL ORGANISfS AUX ATATS-UNS.

Le boycottage, le picketing et la grive de sympathie en tant qu'instruments du contrat collectif de travail et de la boutique syndiqu e. Par
Edouard Lambert et Halfred C. Brown. (Tome 6. Bibliotheque de
L'lnstitut de Droit Compar6 de Lyon.) Paris, Marcel Giard, 1924. pp.
xii, 469.
This extended monograph, which constitutes the sixth of the series of
studies published by the Institut de Droit Compari de Lyon under the directioh of Professor Lambert, is in a sense a continuation of two previous studies in the same series by J. Fouilland (Allen v. Flood), and by R. Hoffherr, (Le Boycottage devant les Cours Anglaises). Vhilst these two studies
dealt with aspects of English labor law, the present volume, product of collaboration between teacher and student, invites the attention of the French
reader to the field of American labor law, closely related to, and certainly
not less significant than, that of England.
From the significant jurisprudence which the courts in this country have
been evolving in order to regularize the course of industrial warfare, the authors have drawn a central but restricted theme. Unable, through the inadequacy of the facilities At their disposal, to study the decisions of the American state courts or even of the inferior federal courts in any comprehensive
manner, they have confessedly limited themselves chiefly to the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States from x9o8 to i921 in which the
regimen by which labor is to be limited in its struggles with capital is defined.
More precisely, the study before us is divided into three parts, the first
prefatory and the third appendant to the second. In the first part, after a
brief survey of the policies adopted by organized labor prior to i9o8, a preliminary analysis of the diverse weapons or methods of industrial combat,
connotated by or intimately connected with that rather unprecise term, boycott, is undertaken, and the scope of the study thereby limited to boycotts directed against employers by employees and to their frequent concomitant%
picketing and sympathetic strikes. As counterpart to the foregoing, there
ensues a sketch of the antecedents and purposes of the American Manufacturers' Association -and more particularly of its filial, the American 'Anti-Boy-
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cott Association, into which the Sherman Act is somewhat incongruously introduced with a view, it seems, to suggesting its availability as of i9o8 for
the defense of manufacturers against boycotting. Upon this background the
facts, arguments and judicial conclusions in the Danbury Hatters' Case
(Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274), and in the various somewhat indecisive
proceedings between the Buck's Stove and Range Company and the American Federation of Labor which culminated in two judgments of the Supreme
Court in 1911 (Buck's Stove and Range Company v. American Federation of
Labor, 219 U. S. 58r; Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Company, 221 U.
S. 418), are depicted in considerable detail. The discussion of these cases is
naturally followed by an account of the agitation for pro-labor legislation
which they accentuated, in the course of which the provisions of the English.
Trades Disputes Act of i9o6 and the appropriate sections of the Clayton Act
are compared, somewhat to the disadvantage of the latter. A succinct resume of the relations between labor and capital during the war period concludes the first part. The second and most extended portion of the treatise
analyzes in comprehensive detail the facts, arguments pro et contra, and the
effects of the three important cases of "192 in which the Supreme Court of
the United States deliberately stated the policies of the 'federal law with
regard to boycotting. sympathetic strikes and picketing and, in so doing, also
aiefined the Clayton Act as declaratory of their previous decisions and affirmed
their power to review state labor legislation in conflict therewith (Duplex
Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Ccntral Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184; Truax .v. Corrigax,
257 U. S. 312). The third and final section of the monograph discusses
in a perhaps less elaborate fashion the cases subsequent to 1921, in particular, United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company, 259
U. S. M; Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. U. S. Railroad Labor Board,
261 U. S. 72; and the opinion of Amidon, D. I., in Great Northern Railway
Company v. Brosseaw, 286 Fed. 414,-and affects to find in the directions taken
in these cases, as well as in the powerful dissents in the Duplex Printing
Press Company and Truiax cases, an indication that the decisions of the Supreme Court of i92i and in particular the judgment of Mr. Justice Pitney in
the Duplex Printing Press case represent the apogee of the judicial reaction
against the policies and methods of union labor, which in the opinion -of
Professor Lambert will probably be tempered in the future.
The picture drawn by the authors from the foregoing materials is Instructive and loses not by the high relief in which the decisions of the Supreme Court are delineated. The result is at least to thrust to the foreground the methods of interpretation which have been employed by that
august tribunal in reaching its conclusions, not the least interesting of which
is the use which it has made of sections x6 and 2o of the Clayton Act in
consolidating its previous decisions. In general, the picture, though not always cohesive, is true and temperate, since the purpose of the authors is to
inform the French public rather than to enter the lists of argument: in any
event, it would lead us too far afield for the purposes of a review to discuss
in any detail the problems which are involved. But this same didactic pur-

